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Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?: Censorship of Hate
Speech May Well Increase Violence
Gordon Danning*
From Charlottesville to college campuses, people with odious views
have been very much in the news over the past year. Responses to those people
and the groups to which they belong have ranged from efforts to keep them
from speaking in person,1 to deleting their presence on the internet,2 to efforts
to have them terminated from their jobs3 or evicted from their apartments,4 and
even to physical assault by members of such groups as Antifa.5 Such efforts at
censoring, ostracizing, and stigmatizing hate group members are generally justified by claims that such individuals are dangerous.6
It is true that some scholars have found an association between the existence of far-right hate groups and the occurrence of far-right ideological violence;7 however, it is also true others have failed to find an association between
hate groups and hate crimes,8 and that the majority of hate crimes are committed not by ideologically-motivated individuals, but rather by groups of bored
*

Gordon Danning, J.D., is the History Research Fellow at the Foundation for Individual
Rights in Education.
1
Vince Cestone, VIDEO: Right-Wing Group “No to Marxism in America” Denied Permit
for Berkeley Rally, KRON4 (Aug. 25, 2017, 4:49 PM), http://kron4.com/2017/08/24/rightwing-group-no-to-marxism-in-america-denied-permit-for-berkeley-rally/.
2
Matthew Rozsa, Twitter is Starting to Purge Its “Alt-Right” Users, SALON (Dec. 18, 2017,
12:00 PM), https://www.salon.com/2017/12/18/twitter-is-starting-to-purge-its-alt-rightusers/.
3
Naomi LaChance, More Nazis are Getting Identified and Fired After Charlottesville,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 17, 2017, 1:21 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/morenazis-are-getting-identified-and-fired-after-charlottesville_us_599477dbe4b0eef7ad2c0318.
4
Julia Marsh, Landlord Trying to Evict Tenant for Hanging Confederate Flags in Windows,
N.Y. POST (Aug. 21, 2017, 11:31 AM), https://nypost.com/2017/08/21/landlord-trying-toevict-tenant-for-flying-confederate-flags-in-windows/.
5
Katie Bo Williams, Antifa Activists Say Violence is Necessary, THE HILL (Sept. 14, 2017,
6:30 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/350524-antifa-activists-say-violenceis-necessary.
6
Terror from the Right, SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR. (Nov. 1, 2015),
https://www.splcenter.org/20151101/terror-right.
7
Amy Adamczyk et al., The Relationship Between Hate Groups and Far-Right Ideological
Violence,
30
J.
CONTEMP.
CRIM.
JUST.
310,
310
(2014),
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1043986214536659.
8
Matt E. Ryan & Peter T. Leeson, Hate Groups and Hate Crime, 31 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
256, 262 (2011), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818811000597.

1

2

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL FORUM

[Vol. 3:1

youths9 who are often under the influence of alcohol.10 Most importantly, there
is substantial evidence that censorship and demonization of hate group members is counterproductive because they tend to lead to more violence, not less.
To understand why that is the case, it is essential to take a step back
and consider why individuals engage in political violence in the first place. Is it
because they are content, feel respected, and feel that they are treated fairly by
government and society? Clearly not. Rather, individuals engage in political
violence only when they have grievances.11 That does not mean that they have
been treated in an objectively onerous or unfair manner. Rather, individuals are
“aggrieved” in a way which is likely to drive them to political violence when
they have been treated in a manner which they consider unjust:
Grievances are not merely expressions of deprivation and dissatisfaction. People can be deprived, disappointed, frustrated,
or dissatisfied without feeling that they have been unjustly or
unfairly treated -- their unsatisfactory outcome may be “just
the way things are” or the result of divine judgment, or a consequence of personal ineptitude. In contrast, a real grievance,
regarded as the basis for complaint or redress, rests upon the
claim that an injustice has been inflicted upon undeserving
victims. Grievances are normative protests, claiming violations of rights or rules.12
The key concept here is that individuals are likely to feel aggrieved if
they believe that rights or rules have been violated and, hence, that they have
been treated unjustly. Indeed, as a recently published book points out, almost
all violence is morally motivated in the sense that it is seen by the perpetrator
as being morally permissible or even mandatory.13 That is often the case even
with hate crimes.14
Thus, because grievances are based on perceived violations of rights
and rules and because violence is morally motivated, the circumstances that
9
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prompt violence will vary from society to society since no two societies have
identical ideas about morality, about the rules that govern society, or about the
rights which inhere to members of society. For example, in thirteenth century
France, a miller’s daughter would not be aggrieved were she told that she could
never be ruler because such a statement would be consistent with the rules of
that society. In the contemporary United States, by contrast, children are taught
from an early age that “anyone can grow up to be president.” As a result, a person who is barred from running for president due to his or her class of birth
would most certainly feel aggrieved because that bar would violate a commonly accepted “right or rule.”
Therefore, there is no objective test for political grievance. History is
full of people and groups who seem objectively oppressed but consider their
circumstances to be legitimate. As a recent doctoral dissertation from the London School of Economics and Political Science notes, “in order for people to
take action to address inequalities, the first step is to recognize them and to
consider them unjust.”15 Indeed, all societies are unequal in some way. Every
society tells those at the bottom of the hierarchy that their circumstances are
just and, hence, that political violence is unnecessary or wrongful. Often that
claim is buttressed by religious beliefs: Hinduism justifies the caste system;
Buddhism tells its adherents that the solution to misery is not to attempt to supplant those who have more material goods, but rather to give up the desire for
those goods; and Christianity classically taught that justice for the oppressed is
not to be achieved by violence in this world, but rather will be delivered in the
next, for “the meek . . . shall inherit the Earth,”16 and “it is easier for a camel to
go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of
God.”17 Even slavery is sometimes deemed morally acceptable by those enslaved.18
So, if members of hate groups are barred from expressing their views,
are they likely to feel that a “right or rule” has been violated? It certainly seems
so. The ideals of free speech, civil liberties, and cultural and political egalitarianism are central to what social scientists call the “American Creed,” which
Anatol Lieven described as “integral to American nationalism.”19 In other
words, respect for free speech defines what it means to be a member of the
American nation (i.e., an “American”).
Thus, the idea that every American has the right to speak her or his
mind—a right which is protected to a greater extent in the United States than in
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any other country on Earth20—is clearly one of the basic rules of American society. If that rule is violated by silencing “hate group” members—even though
the silencing is done with good motives—then by definition those individuals
will feel aggrieved. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently held that even convicted sex offenders have a right to access the internet,21 so “hate group” members
who are told that they are so loathsome that their views are not welcome on the
internet are likely to see their treatment as unjust—even if objective observers
can distinguish between sex offenders and “hate group” members. Hence, it
should be expected that silencing and stigmatizing hate group members will
create
grievances
and
thereby
make
violence
more
likely.
Indeed, there is substantial scholarship which indicates that censorship
or stigmatization of extremist groups and their members tends to drive them to
employ violence. For example, a recent study by a professor at the University
of Oslo’s Center for Research on Extremism examined differences in the level
of right-wing terrorist violence in eighteen western European countries between
1990 and 2015.22 It found that one “recipe” for increased right-wing violence
was elites responding to right-wing extremism by repressing and stigmatizing
extremist groups and opinions.23 That finding is consistent with what scholars
of political violence have long known:
[I]f groups are excluded, or feel themselves to be excluded,
from democratic channels of participation, then violent action
may be seen as the most rational means of political action
open to them . . . . Political violence is thus fostered by the exclusion or marginalization [sic] of groups from the established
channels of democratic politics.”24
To put it another way, “[w]hen normal channels of access to the political system are blocked, extreme forms of political violence are perceived as necessary[.]25
Thus, censoring and otherwise stigmatizing members of hate groups
increases the risk of violence by causing members to feel that they have been
treated unjustly. However, that is not the only way that such strategies are often
counterproductive. Censorship and other stigmatization of hate groups and their
members also tends to make them increasingly extreme, which means that they
20
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are increasingly willing to use violence. There are several ways that those strategies tend to radicalize hate groups and their members.
First, it is commonly understood by social psychologists that repression and ostracism of groups leads members to identify more strongly with
those groups.26 A study of members of three extremist right-wing parties in Italy found that physical or verbal assaults on young persons because of their
right-wing political views “favoured the development of interviewees’ image of
themselves as extreme right-wing activists.”27 Similarly, in Europe, censorship
and verbal delegitimization of those deemed radical Muslims have made radical
groups more attractive to Muslims who feel alienated from society.28
Second, censorship and ostracism of members of extremist parties
tends to drive out relative moderates, leaving only the most extreme members,
who are more likely to use violence.29 That is true both of extremist groups on
the left, as in Italy in the 1960s and early 1970s30, and of extremist groups on
the right, as is demonstrated by a study of ten anti-immigrant parties in Europe
that found parties that were ostracized continued to be extremist, while parties
which were not ostracized became more moderate.31 Moreover, since men are
less deterred by the social stigma against the radical right than are women,32
and since men are more willing to engage in violence than are women, ostracism is likely to leave extremist groups largely in the hands of men (i.e., those
most likely to support the use of violence).
Third, censorship and ostracism of extremists plays into the hands of
the leaders of extremist parties who use the threat as a means of increasing solidarity33 and a sense of victimization among rank-and-file members, thereby
26
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radicalizing formerly more moderate members.34 Thus, it is no surprise that the
2009 hate speech prosecution of Dutch right-wing politician Geert Wilders increased his support in the subsequent election.35
Finally, censorship, stigmatization, and ostracism interfere with efforts
to deradicalize extremists because, in order for deradicalization to be effective,
it is essential for the individual to be respected, even as his or her opinions and
behaviors are challenged.36
It seems quite clear, then, that the most common responses to hate
group members and other extremists are likely to be counterproductive and
should be discouraged. A key first step in responding to extremists is to strive
to treat such individuals, though not their ideas, with respect. After all, these
people are clearly upset about something. It does not matter why they are upset.
It does not matter that they are upset because they have bad upbringings and are
possibly emotionally unstable as a result.37 It does not matter if they are upset
about the loss of their “white privilege”38 or if they are being manipulated by
agents of “global capitalism” or other elites.39 Nor is the question whether society should accede to their demands because the answer to that is clearly “no.”
The vow of the protesters at Charlottesville that “Jews will not replace us”40
obviously should not and will not become the basis of public policy. Rather, the
question is how should society respond to the expression of those ideas in a
way which does not exacerbate grievances or increase the risk of violence?
This challenge was stated succinctly by Jacob Ravndal in his recent
41
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pression and political freedoms for all people, including those on the far right,
on the one hand, while trying to prevent any form of antidemocratic or violent
behaviour, on the other.”42 In the words of the political scientist John
Schwartzmantel,
There are two implications here for the politics of liberaldemocracy: the first is the need for the creation of new institutions which are more inclusive than the present institutions of
liberal democracy . . . The second implication is that there
needs to be a change in the discourse of politics—from one
that is confrontational and dogmatic to one that puts greater
emphasis on dialogue and communication.43
As much as people fear hate speech, history teaches us two things.
First, people are far less susceptible to propaganda than is popularly assumed.44
Second, and most importantly, the ideals of liberal democracy have repeatedly
won out in the marketplace of ideas. Hence, while putting up with reprehensible beliefs is deeply unpleasant, the alternative is likely worse. The best—or,
perhaps, the “least bad”—solution to the problem posed by those who express
odious opinions is not less respect for civil liberties and democracy, but more.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the rest of us to be the “adults in the room” by
respecting the extremist individual, while challenging their opinions and behaviors.45
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